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Government Quality Determinants of Stock Market Performance in 
Developing Countries
Abstract
How do government policies and institutions affect stock market performance? As stock 
markets grow broader and deeper in developing countries, the question becomes more critical. 
Government quality dynamics of corruption-control, government-effectiveness, political-stability 
or no violence, voice and accountability, regulation quality and rule of law are instrumented with 
income-levels,  religious-dominations,  press-freedom degrees  and legal  origins  to  account  for 
stock  market  performance  dynamics  of  capitalization,  value  traded,  turnover  and number  of 
listed  companies.  The  results  demonstrate  a  significant  positive  association  between  stock 
market performance measures and the quality of government institutions. These findings suggest 
countries with better developed government institutions would favor stock markets with higher 
market capitalization, better turnover ratios, higher value in shares traded and a greater number 
of listed companies.
JEL Classification: G10 ; G18; G28; P16;  P43
Keywords:  Financial Markets; Government Policy; Political Economy
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1.  Introduction
The  emergence  of  London  as  a  world  financial  center  was  made  possible  by  the 
reputation of fairness that the English courts and common-law had acquired by the 20 th century 
(Rosenberg & Birdzell,  1986).  The Russian experience  has  shown that  foreign investors  are 
willing to provide funds and much needed managing expertise to newly privatized firms only if 
the  legal  and  political  infrastructure  is  adequate  at  curbing  corruption  among  government 
officials and limiting the risks of expropriation.
The  deepening  and broadening  of  stock  markets  in  developing  countries  presents  an 
important concern of how government policies and institutions affect stock market performance. 
According to  the IMF (2006) and Mosley (2008) stock market  capitalization  stood at  $37.2 
trillion,  compared to global GDP of $41.3 trillion. Whereas this figure was slightly less than 
global  commercial  bank  assets  ($  57.3  trillion),  it  markedly  exceeded  the  total  size  of 
outstanding public securities, which stood at $ 23.1 trillion.  The bulk of global stock market 
capitalization broadly represents developed-country equity markets, but less developed countries 
which accounted for 14% of total capitalization in 2004 are quickly gaining ground. For instance 
some emerging markets like those of Malaysia,  Singapore and South Africa have total  stock 
market capitalizations that exceed their respective Gross Domestic Products.  The overall growth 
of  developing  financial  markets  has  attracted  attention  from  scholars  and  pundits.  A  large 
literature  in  economics,  political  science  and public  policy considers  the ways  in  which  the 
increased globalization in trade and finance affects national economic outcomes and government 
policy  making  (Helleiner,  1994;  Strange,  1996;  Friedman,  1999;  Armijo,  1999;  Obstfeld  & 
Taylor, 2004). However, given the increasing importance of developing capital markets in the 
world economy, we currently know very little about how government quality influences financial 
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market  dynamics.  In  this  work  we  address  this  gap  by  exploring  how  government  quality 
dynamics  of  corruption-control,  government-effectiveness,  political-stability  or  no  violence, 
voice and accountability, regulation quality and rule of law affect stock market performance in 
African financial markets. 
The rest of the paper is organized in the following manner. Section 2 reviews existing 
literature. Data and methodology are discussed and outlined respectively in Section 3. Empirical 
analysis and discussion of results are covered in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Literature Review 
Democracy, Good Governance or Government Quality (hence GQ) have been subject to 
much attention in circles dealing with developing countries. GQ is now used by many national 
development  agencies  and international  organizations  such as  the  World  Bank,  International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the United Nations to assess the state of developing countries.  In 
1996,  the  concern  of  the  IMF  with  development  could  be  summarized  in  the  following 
declaration:  "promoting good governance in all its aspects, including by ensuring the rule of  
law, improving the efficiency and accountability of the public sector, and tackling corruption, as  
essential elements of a framework within which economies can prosper” (IMF, 2005). Elements 
of this definition would guide our conception of GQ through-out the paper.
As  we  have  outlined  earlier,  this  paper  investigates  how  GQ  dynamics  affect  the 
performance of stock markets in African countries. GQ describes the institutional arrangements 
that regulate financial markets. These institutions compose the legal, political and supervisory 
bodies that provide cohesion and order in business activities. The equitable functioning of the 
legal process, the degree of political stability, the level of systematic corruption, the height of 
voice and accountability, the rule of law and regulation quality are factors that define the quality 
4
of these institutions and their ability to oversee financial markets. GQ has important implications 
on the dealings of firms and institutions and the cost associated with such interactions. 
The capacity of the judiciary to enforce contractual rights of shareholders impinges on 
the possibility of managerial expropriation and ultimately on the profitability of firms. In this 
line of thought, La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) argue that improving corporate governance rules, 
their enforcements and the quality of accounting standards results in greater reliance on stock 
market  financing by companies.  More so, judicial  factors directly infringe on the amount  of 
corporate resources diverted by managers and allow shareholders the possibility of monitoring 
managers at  lower cost. Legal systems supportive of investor protection tend to improve the 
amount of funds that risk-averse investors are willing to channel towards firms. Some authors 
have pointed to the importance of legal environments and corporate standards in fund manager 
investments (Aggarwal et al., 2002).  
GQ environment can increase returns to shareholders by reducing both transaction and 
agency costs. The early literature on GQ is focused on firm-level agency cost arising from the 
ownership and control delineation structure of firms. The seminal work of Jensen & Meckling 
(1976) provided the conceptual framework for a growing body of studies. The pioneering work 
discovered  that  corporate  governance  mechanisms  themselves  are  subject  to  varying 
interpretations and weak degrees of enforceability and that the level of investor protection which 
such mechanisms were designed to promote could deteriorate in the face of structurally flawless 
governance provisions. Thus the strength of such mechanisms rested solely on the ability of 
firms to adhere to them. Consequently, enforceability of contractual provisions became the first 
extension in the conception and understanding of the agency conflict  between managers and 
shareholders.  In  recent  literature  however,  the  focus  has  been  shifted  from  firm-specific 
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governance to country level governance environments (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998; Shleifer & 
Wolfenson, 2002; Asongu, 2011abcde; Agbor, 2011). Beyond the interaction between firms and 
institutions resulting from agency cost, transaction costs have been the neglect in many market-
centered views of economic structure. North (1994) argued that tightly defined property rights 
and their cost effective enforcements are important requirements for low-cost transactions which 
are paramount to productive economies. 
The benefits  of judicial  improvements include not only stock market enlargement but 
also greater integration with world financial markets through the appeal to influx of capital. But 
increasing integration may turn to decrease the importance of the quality of securities regulation. 
According to Hooper et al. (2009) increasing market integration significantly lowers the cost of 
capital.  Hail & Leuz (2003) investigate to what extent the effect of the legal institutions and 
securities regulation differs by market regulation and economic progress. Supposing investors 
can invest freely around the world, the quality of securities regulation of any particular country 
may  become  less  important.  From both  theoretical  and empirical  evidence,  country-specific 
factors become less important in asset pricing as markets become more integrated (Bekaert & 
Harvey, 1995; Stulz, 1999). However note should be taken of the fact that, the precedence of this 
increasing integration are the benefits of judicial enforcement and environmental GQ.  Hail & 
Leuz(2003) assess international differences in the cost of equity for firms across 40 countries. 
They analyze if differences in countries’ legal institutions (and in particular securities regulation) 
are systematically related to international cost of capital variations. Their findings reveal that 
firms in countries with strong legal institutions have on average lower cost of capital than those 
in countries with weak legal systems, after controlling for risk and country factors.  In essence,  
cost of capital is systematically lower in countries with strong securities regulation which have 
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extensive disclosure rules and strong legal enforcement. Thus, effects are highest for institutions 
that mandate disclosure to investors and are also present for those institutions that facilitate the 
enforcement of financial contracts, either by lowering the burden of proof in securities litigation 
or by providing effective courts. 
Rosenberg & Birdzell (1986) postulate the emergence of London as a world financial 
center was made possible by the reputation of fairness that the English courts and common-law 
had acquired by the 20th century. The experience of transitional economies and the central role 
that legal institutions play in the functioning of markets has been abundantly discussed (La Porta 
et al., 2000). The Russian experience has shown that foreign investors are willing to provide 
funds and much  needed managing  expertise  to  newly privatized  firms  only if  the  legal  and 
political infrastructure is adequate at curbing corruption among government officials and limiting 
the  risks  of  expropriation.  Lombardo  &  Pagano(2002)  join  Johnson   &  Shleifer(1999)  in 
underlining that, in order to reap the benefits from market-oriented reforms, policy makers in 
transition economies must make sure that a fair level playing field is established so that investors 
can concentrate on exploiting growth opportunities without fearing the abuse of their property 
rights. 
Another  important  GQ dynamic  developing  countries  must  enforce  is  the  control  of 
corruption which is often the source of insider-dealing and a great many impediments to the 
smooth growth of financial markets. Bhattacharya & Daouk(1999) assess the impact on the cost 
of equity capital of insider trading regulation and discover that, while the mere existence of law 
prohibiting insider trading is ineffectual, their enforcement reduces the risk-adjusted expected 
return on equity. After controlling for risk factors, a liquidity factor and other legal determinants 
of the cost of equity, the assessment finds that the enforcement of insider trading laws reduces 
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the cost of equity by 5%. Himmelberg et al.(2004) hypothesize that lack of investor protection 
forces company insiders to hold greater fractions of the equity of the companies they manage. 
These high holdings subject insiders to a greater rate of idiosyncratic risk that in turn increase the 
risk premium and thus the marginal cost of capital. They postulate a negative link between the 
degree  of  investor  protection  and  the  fraction  of  equity  held  by  insiders  and  a  positive 
relationship between equity ownership and the marginal return to capital. 
The  deepening  and broadening  of  stock  markets  in  developing  countries  presents  an 
important concern of how government policies and institutions affect stock market performance. 
In spite of the large chunk of work in the GQ-finance literature, very few studies have focused 
on developing countries, especially African countries owing to constraints in data availability. 
The few studies that have focused on the continent have been limited to financial intermediary 
(Asongu, 2011abde) and economic (Agbor, 2011) performances. This study contributes to the 
literature by assessing the relationship between the dynamics  of GQ and the performance of 
African stock markets. GQ dynamics of corruption-control, government-effectiveness, political-
stability, voice and accountability, rule of law and regulation quality are instrumented with legal-
origins,  income-levels,  religious-dominations and press-freedoms to account  for stock market 
performance dynamics of capitalization, turnover, value traded and number of listed companies. 
Many African countries especially those in French speaking sub-Sahara have stock markets that 
are  taking  too  long  to  pick-up.  Therefore  findings  could  lead  to  some  important  policy 
implications.   
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3. Data and Methodology
3.1 Data
We investigate  a panel  of 14 African countries with data  from African Development 
Indicators (ADI) of the World Bank (WB) ranging from 1990 to 2010. Corresponding variables 
and countries are presented in the appendices (Appendix 3 and Appendix 4 respectively).  In 
accordance with Yang (2011), dependent variables are stock market capitalization, stock market 
value traded, stock market  turnover,  and number of listed companies.   In line with the IMF 
(2005)  definition;  government  quality  independent  variables  include:  corruption-control, 
government-effectiveness, voice and accountability, political stability or no violence, rule of law 
and regulation quality. Instrumental variables are: legal-origins, press-freedoms, income-levels 
and religious-dominations.  These instruments have been largely documented in the economic 
development  literature  (La Porta  et  al.,  1997;  Stulz  & Williamson,  2003;  Beck et  al.,  2003; 
Agbor, 2011; Asongu, 2011ab). In the regressions we control for GDP growth and population 
growth at the first-stage and only for the former at the second-stage. 
Summary statistics and correlation analysis are presented in Appendix 1 and Appendix 2 
respectively. While the former indicates that the distributions of the variables are comparable, 
the  later  guides  the  empirical  analysis  in  avoiding  issues  related  to  multicolinearity  and 
overparametization. 
3.2 Methodology
3.2.1 Endogeneity 
While GQ affects stock market performance, activities of financial markets also have a 
bearing  on  GQ.  Though  some  scholars  take  a  restrained  view,  others  argue  that  financial 
globalization  generates  a  “golden  straightjacket”  for  governments  (Friedman,  1999).  At  the 
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extreme,  financial  markets  become  masters  of  governments,  eviscerating  the  authority  of 
national states (Helleiner, 1994; Strange, 1996; Cerny, 1999). Investors’ capacity for exit and the 
political  voice  it  confers  is  crucial  to  these  accounts.  Whereas  financial  market  openness 
provides governments with greater access to capital,  it  also subjects them to external market 
discipline (Armijo, 1999; Obstfeld & Taylor, 2004). Governments must sell their policies not 
only to voters but also to foreign investors. Based on the fact that investors can respond swiftly 
and severely to actual or expected outcomes, government must consider financial participants’ 
preferences when choosing policies. The logic follows that financial openness should reduce the 
capacity of governments to tax and spend or more generally pursue divergent policies. Therefore 
this evidence of reverse-causality presents an important issue of endogeneity that should be taken 
into account by the estimation technique. More so, GQ indicators are perception-based measures 
which further confirm the endogeneity issue due to biased perceptions and omitted variables. 
3.2.2 Estimation Technique
In accordance with Beck et al.(2003) and recently African law-finance literature(Asongu, 
2011ab)  the  paper  adopts  an  Instrumental  Variable(IV)  estimation  technique.  IV  estimates 
address the puzzle of endogeneity and thus avoid the inconsistency of estimated coefficients by 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) when the explaining variables are correlated with the error term 
in the equation of interest. In line with Asongu (2011ab), the Two-Stage-Least-Squares (TSLS) 
estimation method adopted by this paper will entail the following steps.
First-stage regression: 
++= itit nlegalorigitQualityGov )(' 10 γγ +itreligion)(2γ itlincomeleve )(3γ                        
                               itompressfreed )(4γ+ υα ++ itiX                                                                  (1) 
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Second-stage regression:
++= itit tChannelGovFinance )'(10 γγ +itiXβ   µ                                                              (2) 
In the two equations,  X is a set of explaining control variables. For the first and second 
equations,   v  and u, respectively represent  the disturbance  terms.  Instrumental  variables  are 
legal-origins, dominant-religions, press-freedoms and income-levels. 
We adopt the following steps in the analysis: 
-justify  the  use  of  a  TSLS  over  an  OLS  estimation  technique  with  the  Hausman-test  for 
endogeneity;
-account, the instruments are exogenous to the endogenous components of explaining variables 
(GQ channels), conditional on other covariates (control variables);
-ensure the instruments are valid and not correlated with the error-term in the equation of interest 
through an Over-identifying Restrictions (OIR) test. 
3.2.3 Robustness checks  
To ensure robustness of the analysis, the following checks will be carried out: (1) usage 
of alternative indicators of GQ dynamics; (2) employment of two distinct interchangeable sets of 
moment conditions that encompass every category of the instruments; (3) usage of alternative 
indicators of stock market performance; (4) account for the concern of endogeneity. 
4. Empirical Analysis 
This section addresses the ability of exogenous components of GQ dynamics to account 
for differences stock market performance; the ability of the instruments to explain variations in 
the endogenous components of GQ dynamics and the possibility of the instruments to account 
for stock market performance beyond GQ dynamic channels. To make these investigations, we 
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use  the  TSLS-IV  estimation  method  with  legal-origins,  press-freedoms,  income-levels  and 
religious-dominations as instrumental variables.
4.1 Quality of government and instruments
Table 1 assesses the validity of the instruments in explaining differences in GQ. Clearly it 
could be observed the distinguishing African countries by legal-origins, income-levels, religious-
denominations  and  press-freedoms  help  explain  cross-countries  differences  in  GQ.  The 
instruments  taken together  enter  significantly in  all  regressions at  the 1% significance  level. 
Broadly,  the  following  could  be  established.  (1)  English  common-law  countries  have 
substantially better levels of GQ than their French civil-law counterparts; in accordance with the 
law-finance  (growth)  literature  (La  Portal  et  al.,  1997,  1998;  Beck  et  al.,  2003)  and  recent 
African law-finance (growth) literature (Asongu, 2011abcde; Agbor, 2011). (2) But for political-
stability, the dominance of Christian nations over those of Moslem decent is very significant; 
which is broadly consistent with El Badawi, & Makdisi (2007). (3) GQ increases with income-
levels; in accordance with Narayan et al.(2011). (4) GQ improves with press-freedom; contrary 
to Vaidya (2005) and Oscarsson (2008). 
4.2 Stock market performance (SMP) and quality of government  
Table 2 investigates two main issues: (1) the ability of GQ channels to account for SMP 
dynamics and (2) the possibility of the instrumental variables explaining SMP dynamics beyond 
GQ channels.  Whereas we address the first  issue by assessing the significance of estimated 
coefficients, the second is looked at through the OIR test. The null hypothesis of this test is the 
position that the instruments account for SMP dynamics only through GQ channels.  Thus  a 
rejection of the null hypothesis is the rejection of the view that the instruments explain SMP 
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dynamics through no other mechanisms than GQ channels. The Hausman test for endogeneity 
precedes  every  the  IV regression.  The  null  hypothesis  of  this  test  is  the  position  that  OLS 
estimates are consistent and efficient. Therefore a rejection of the null hypothesis points to the 
issue of reverse causality (endogeneity) we have elucidated earlier (see Section 3.2.1) and hence 
lends credit to the IV estimation technique. Otherwise we estimate by OLS. In some cases, the 
adjusted coefficient of determination is negative and thus we do not report any results pertaining 
to  the regressions.  For robustness  purposes,  results  are  replicated  using an alternative  set  of 
instrumental variables, as depicted in the second and third to the last lines of Table 2. 
With  regard  to  the  first  concern  which  is  addressed by the  significance  of  estimated 
coefficients, it can be firmly established that GQ dynamics significantly improve SMP in Africa. 
As  concerns  the  second-issue,  failure  to  reject  the  null  hypothesis  of  the  OIR  test  in  all 
regressions (were applicable) signifies that the instruments do not explain SMP through some 
other mechanisms beyond GQ channels. Thus the instruments are valid and not correlated with 
the error term in the equation of interest; the instruments do not suffer-from endogeneity. 
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Table 1: First-stage regressions (Government quality and instruments)
Control of Corruption Government  Effectiveness Voice & Accountability Political Stability Regulation Quality Rule of  Law
Constant -2.865 *** -0.301* -1.329*** -0.254* -0.906*** -1.103*** -3.739*** -6.693*** -3.235*** -0.764*** -2.886*** -0.684***
(-8.948) (-1.851) (-7.190) (-1.666) (-3.748) (-7.964) (-6.762) (-4.733) (-9.485) (-4.556) (-7.490) (-3.467)
Legal-
origins
English  common-law 0.711*** --- 0.342** --- -0.055 --- 1.481*** --- 0.538*** --- 0.771*** ---
(4.642) (2.438) (-0.485) (5.694) (3.357) (4.251)
French civil-law --- -0.495*** --- -0.432*** --- 0.108 --- 7.477*** --- -0.518*** --- -0.725***
(-3.053) (-3.007) (0.810) (5.637) (-3.204) (-3.809)
Religions
Christianity 0.955*** --- --- --- -0.050 --- 1.545*** --- 1.180*** --- 0.984*** ---
(5.722) (-0.420) (5.633) (6.976) (5.147)
Islam --- -0.924*** --- -0.887*** --- -0.058 --- 7.256*** --- -1.223*** --- -1.078***
(-5.514) (-5.495) (-0.420) (5.208) (-7.230) (-5.418)
Income 
Levels
Low Income --- -0.520*** --- -0.485*** --- 0.628*** --- 9.248*** --- -0.489*** --- -0.234
(-3.991) (-3.937) (5.895) (8.685) (-3.794) (-1.546)
Middle Income 1.070*** --- 0.874*** --- 0.650*** --- 0.931*** --- 0.941*** --- 0.912*** ---
(10.27) (8.970) (8.466) (5.298) (8.685) (7.446)
Lower Middle  Income -0.376** --- -0.769*** --- -1.237*** --- -0.499* --- -0.435*** --- -0.640*** ---
(-2.423) (-5.277) (-11.06) (-1.953) (-2.762) (-3.596)
Upper Middle Income --- 0.592*** --- 0.591*** --- 1.443*** --- 13.838*** --- 0.516*** --- 0.820***
(3.948) (3.944) (11.46) (10.88) (3.387) (4.571)
Press 
Freedoms
Free 0.452*** --- 0.519*** --- 0.747*** --- -0.002 --- 0.344*** --- 0.395*** ---
(3.956) (4.758) (8.697) (-0.013) (2.842) (2.884)
Partly Free 0.115 --- 0.132 --- 0.284*** --- -0.392** --- 0.163 --- -0.006 ---
(1.088) (1.224) (3.631) (-2.194) (1.482) (-0.054)
No Freedom --- -0.173* --- -0.183* --- -0.461*** --- -3.151*** --- -0.232** --- -0.146
(-1.731) (-1.846) (-5.354) (-3.750) (-2.233) (-1.195)
Control 
Variables
GDP Growth --- 0.032*** --- 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.040*** 0.064*** 0.156** 0.040*** 0.042*** 0.040*** 0.044***
(3.523) (4.826) (5.370) (5.231) (4.258) (1.985) (4.304) (4.496) (3.836) (4.058)
Population Growth 0.166*** 0.044 0.113*** --- 0.120*** 0.081* 0.033 0.209 0.348*** 0.332*** 0.103* 0.069
(3.747) (0.837) (2.763) (3.133) (1.821) (0.385) (0.494) (6.410) (6.146) (1.692) (1.096)
Adjusted R² 0.811 0.813 0.829 0.813 0.926 0.898 0.716 0.708 0.823 0.819 0.809 0.788
Fisher test 67.539*** 68.266*** 80.633*** 79.760*** 173.466*** 138.922*** 35.440*** 57.919*** 64.372*** 71.658*** 58.819*** 59.160***
Observations 109 109 99 109 110 110 110 165 110 110 110 110
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%  respectively.
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Table 2: Second-stage regressions (Stock market performance and government quality)
Panel A:   Stock Market Capitalization and  Total Value Traded
Stock Market  Capitalization Stock  Market Value  Traded
Constant 0.627*** 0.210*** 0.707*** n.a 0.638*** 0.630*** 0.174* 0.210*** 0.217*** n.a 0.168* 0.166*
(3.605) (4.531) (9.283) (3.575) (3.449) (1.866) (4.531) (4.664) (1.822) (1.743)
Control of Corruption 0.462*** --- --- --- --- --- 0.190*** --- --- --- --- ---
(4.199) (3.190)
Government Effectiveness --- 0.189*** --- --- --- --- --- 0.189*** --- --- --- ---
(3.671) (3.671)
Voice & Accountability --- --- 0.290*** --- --- --- --- --- 0.131*** --- --- ---
(4.792) (3.469)
Political  Stability --- --- --- n.a --- --- --- --- --- n.a --- ---
Regulation Quality --- --- --- --- 0.540*** --- --- --- --- --- 0.218*** ---
(4.135) (3.119)
Rule of Law --- --- --- --- --- 0.401*** --- --- --- --- --- 0.162***
(4.036) (3.050)
GDP  Growth -0.029 -0.016* -0.041*** n.a -0.033 -0.021 -0.006 -0.016* -0.013* --- -0.006 -0.001
(-0.759) (-1.920) (-3.219) (-0.847) (-0.542) (-0.297) (-1.920) (-1.730) (-0.293) (-0.051)
Hausman test 19.074*** 0.201 1.059 53.801*** 15.435*** 40.681*** 14.389*** 0.201 1.438 26.733*** 5.904* 27.894***
OIR-Sargan 1.333 n.a n.a n.a 1.210 0.809 0.935 n.a n.a n.a 1.793 1.159
P-value [0.721] [0.750] [0.847] [0.816] [0.616] [0.762]
Cragg-Donald 3.581 n.a n.a n.a 3.916 3.860 3.482 n.a n.a n.a 3.863 3.828
Adjusted R² 0.094 0.131 0.145 -0.019 0.082 0.034 0.035 0.087 0.073 -0.017 0.055 0.001
Fisher 10.564*** 6.770*** 13.473*** n.a 10.239*** 9.722*** 6.695*** 7.004*** 6.361*** n.a 6.521*** 6.157***
Observations 105 91 148 106 106 100 127 137 101 101
Panel B:  Stock Market Turnover and Number of Listed Companies
Stock Market Turnover Number of Listed Companies
Constant n.a 0.142*** n.a n.a n.a n.a 0.126*** 0.140*** 0.102*** 0.083*** 0.135*** 0.110***
(7.910) (5.564) (4.822) (9.765) (3.778) (5.062) (11.08)
Control of Corruption n.a --- --- --- --- --- 0.113*** --- --- --- --- ---
(6.562)
Government Effectiveness --- 0.070*** --- --- --- --- --- 0.124*** --- --- --- ---
(3.532) (5.265)
Voice & Accountability --- --- n.a --- --- --- --- --- 0.058*** --- --- ---
(6.627)
Political  Stability --- --- --- n.a --- --- --- --- --- 0.077*** --- ---
(5.315)
Regulation Quality --- --- --- --- n.a --- --- --- --- --- 0.126*** ---
(5.642)
Rule of Law --- --- --- --- --- n.a --- --- --- --- --- 0.073***
(8.300)
GDP  Growth n.a -0.005* n.a n.a n.a n.a -0.005 -0.010 -0.003* 0.004 -0.008 -0.004***
(-1.658) (-1.177) (-1.439) (-1.869) (0.883) (-1.385) (-2.930)
Hausman test 23.554*** 0.711 3.653 26.733*** 16.414*** 54.909**** 19.159*** 6.609** 0.238 21.731*** 26.916*** 3.519
OIR-Sargan n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 0.436 3.265 n.a 5.250 4.324 n.a
P-value [0.932] [0.352] [0.154] [0.228]
Cragg-Donald n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 4.475 2.247 n.a 5.854 4.771 n.a
Adjusted R² -0.002 0.073 -0.0006 -0.012 -0.004 -0.018 0.265 0.093 0.217 0.154 0.176 0.307
Fisher n.a 6.330*** n.a n.a n.a n.a 26.485*** 22.102*** 21.984*** 17.915*** 20.010*** 34.477***
Observations 135 108 98 152 109 109 152
Initial Instruments Constant; Lower Middle Income; Middle Income; English; Christians; Free Press; Partly Free Press
Robust Instruments Constant; Upper Middle Income; Low Income; French; Islam; Not Free Press 
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%  respectively. OIR: Overidentifying  Restrictions
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4.3 Discussion of results, policy implications and limitations 
The results demonstrate that GQ is positively associated with stock market performance 
in  the  African  continent;  consistent  with  Hooper  et  al.  (2009).  Thus  countries  that  have  an 
efficient  institutional  environment  should  expect  improvements  in  their  stock  market 
performance dynamics. Risk-averse investors would not invest in countries that are not mean-
variance efficient. Results indirectly support the view that the quality of governance reduces both 
transaction and agency costs, which maximize shareholder return. 
Many African countries especially those in French speaking sub-Saharan Africa have 
stock markets that are taking too long to pick-up. The road to stock market development depends 
significantly on institutional  arrangements  and the regulatory environment.  Quite  often these 
arrangements  have  been  ignored.  Corruption  remains  dire  in  the  continent  and represents  a 
significant risk to financial market development. To sum up, a policy recommendation to African 
countries  could be summarized in the following:  increase the control  of corruption,  improve 
government effectiveness, avoid incidences of violence and political instability that send wrong 
signals  to  international  investors,  promote  institutions  of  voice  and  accountability,  maintain 
regulation quality and respect for the rule of law. 
The  main  limitation  of  this  work  is  that  it  doesn’t  incorporate  the  diversification 
dimension into the analysis. It has been well documented that integration reduces the country 
risk effects on the decision of investment (Bekaert & Harvey, 1995; Stulz, 1999; Hail & Leuz, 
2003).  Therefore  with  international  market  integration  and  diversification,  poor  governance 
impact on SMP could become insignificant. In this context, stocks in a market with higher risk 
and  lower  returns  are  still  held  by  risk-averse  investors  due  to  the  portfolio  diversification 
benefits. However, this limitation (absence of diversification dimension) doesn’t much apply to 
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African stock markets owing to relatively lower levels of integration (; with the exception of 
South Africa and Egypt).  Another important limitation worth mentioning is that this  kind of 
analysis depends to a great extent on the integrity of the proxy for GQ obtained from perception-
based  measures.  Therefore  omitted  variables  and  media-effect  may  significantly  influence 
perceptions  of  GQ  and  consequently  bias  the  link  between  the  GQ  indicators  and  the 
performance measures. However, to the best of our knowledge there are no better indicators of 
GQ other than those from African Development Indicators of the World Bank. The paper has 
limited this setback by using six different measures of GQ. Also the use of a methodology that 
accounts for endogeneity addresses concerns of omitted-variables and bias in the perception-
based measures.  
5. Conclusion
Many  African  countries  especially  those  in  French  speaking  sub-Sahara  have  stock 
markets that are taking too long to pick-up. How do government policies and institutions affect 
stock market performance? As stock markets grow broader and deeper in developing countries, 
the  question  becomes  more  critical.  Government  quality  dynamics  of  corruption-control, 
government-effectiveness, political-stability or no violence, voice and accountability, regulation 
quality  and  rule  of  law  are  instrumented  with  income-levels,  religious-dominations,  press-
freedom  degrees  and  legal  origins  to  account  for  stock  market  performance  qualities  of 
capitalization, value traded, turnover and number of listed companies. The results demonstrate a 
significant positive association between stock market performance measures and the quality of 
government  institutions.  These  findings  suggest  countries  with  better  developed  government 
institutions would favor stock markets with higher market capitalization, better turnover ratios, 
higher value in shares traded and greater number of listed companies.
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Further research attempting to assess the association between institutional  factors and 
financial  markets should use firm-specific indicators to confirm the findings. Also, exploring 
how foreign direct investment is impacted by the quality of government could have interesting 
policy implications. 
.
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Summary Statistics
Variables Mean S.D Min. Max. Observations
Stock Market 
Performance
Stock Market  Capitalization 0.354 0.521 0.008 3.382 259
Stock Market  Value Traded  0.078 0.268 0.000 2.591 245
Stock Market Turnover 0.095 0.119 0.000 0.704 253
Number of Listed Companies 0.067 0.085 0.002 0.712 268
Government 
Quality 
Control of Corruption -0.259 0.666 -1.489 1.086 167
Government Effectiveness -0.171 0.654 -1.674 0.807 155
Political Stability -0.314 0.885 -2.530 1.122 168
Regulation Quality -0.224 0.694 -2.394 0.905 168
Rule of Law -0.325 0.756 -1.913 1.053 168
Voice and Accountability -0.389 0.793 -1.805 1.047 168
Control 
Variables
GDP growth 3.504 3.719 -17.254 12.272 294
Population growth 1.952 0.775 -0.143 3.739 294
Instrumental 
Variables
English Common-Law 0.714 0.452 0.000 1.000 294
French Civil-Law 0.285 0.452 0.000 1.000 294
Christianity 0.714 0.452 0.000 1.000 294
Islam 0.285 0.452 0.000 1.000 294
Low Income 0.285 0.452 0.000 1.000 294
Middle Income 0.714 0.452 0.000 1.000 294
Lower Middle Income 0.428 0.495 0.000 1.000 294
Upper Middle Income 0.285 0.452 0.000 1.000 294
Press Freedom 0.345 0.476 0.000 1.000 165
Partial Press Freedom 0.230 0.422 0.000 1.000 165
No Press Freedom 0.424 0.495 0.000 1.000 165
S.D: Standard Deviation.  Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. 
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Appendix 2: Correlation Analysis     
Stock Market Performance Quality of Government Control Vles Instrumental Variables
SMC SMVT SMT ListC CC Gov.E PolS R.Q R.L V&A GDP Popg Eng. Frch. Chris Islam LI MI LMI UMI Free PFree NFree
1.000 0.863 0.733 0.242 0.19 0.308 0.008 0.22 0.165 0.310 -0.11 -0.29 0.109 -0.109 0.123 -0.12 -0.14 0.144 -0.234 0.399 0.391 -0.12 -0.272 SMC
1.000 0.795 0.084 0.15 0.273 0.045 0.21 0.119 0.257 -0.04 -0.20 0.074 -0.074 0.065 -0.06 -0.13 0.130 -0.138 0.274 0.337 -0.13 -0.215 SMVT
1.000 0.078 0.09 0.261 -0.061 0.12 0.115 0.096 -0.02 -0.30 -0.18 0.180 -0.24 0.24 -0.17 0.176 0.048 0.117 0.340 -0.06 -0.277 SMT
1.000 0.43 0.423 0.397 0.33 0.526 0.458 0.029 -0.38 0.146 -0.146 0.156 -0.15 -0.30 0.308 -0.261 0.596 0.557 -0.18 -0.375 ListC
1.00 0.912 0.826 0.82 0.899 0.719 0.299 -0.21 0.068 -0.068 0.100 -0.10 -0.48 0.482 -0.233 0.737 0.725 -0.14 -0.588 CC
1.000 0.737 0.84 0.888 0.719 0.347 -0.17 0.064 -0.064 -0.16 0.163 -0.50 0.050 -0.184 0.695 0.777 -0.00 -0.769 Gov. E
1.000 0.71 0.848 0.627 0.270 -0.24 0.211 -0.211 0.238 -0.23 -0.19 0.190 -0.375 0.601 0.591 -0.24 -0.370 PolS
1.00 0.866 0.725 0.444 0.100 0.013 -0.013 0.066 -0.06 -0.39 0.399 -0.207 0.627 0.618 -0.02 -0.583 R..Q
1.000 0.709 0.336 -0.18 0.004 -0.004 0.007 -0.00 -0.39 0.391 -0.245 0.660 0.730 -0.15 -0.581 R.L
1.000 0.292 0.065 0.471 -0.471 0.397 -0.39 -0.07 0.079 -0.676 0.821 0.805 -0.00 -0.784 V&A
1.000 0.134 -0.03 0.033 -0.16 0.165 -0.17 0.174 0.070 0.097 0.254 0.107 -0.336 GDPg
1.000 0.099 -0.099 0.152 -0.15 0.214 -0.214 -0.038 -0.17 -0.24 0.253 0.017 Popg
1.000 -1.000 0.650 -0.65 0.400 -0.400 -0.730 0.400 0.229 0.173 -0.368 English
1.000 -0.65 0.65 -0.40 0.400 0.730 -0.40 -0.22 -0.17 0.368 French
1.000 -1.00 0.400 -0.400 -0.730 0.400 0.229 -0.37 0.100 Christian
1.000 -0.40 0.400 0.730 -0.40 -0.22 0.377 -0.100 Islam
1.000 -1.000 0.547 0.400 -0.36 -0.09 -0.268 LIncome
1.000 0.547 0.400 0.363 -0.09 -0.268 MIncome
1.000 -0.54 -0.44 0.020 0.410 LMI
1.000 0.775 -0.11 -0.648 UMI
1.000 -0.39 -0.623 Free
1.000 -0.469 PFree
1.000 NFree
SMC: Stock Market Capitalization. SMVT: Stock Market Value Traded. SMT: Stock Market Turnover. ListC: Listed Companies. CC: Control of Corruption.  Gov. E: Government Effectiveness. PolS: Political Stability or No  
Violence. R.Q: Regulation Quality. R.L: Rule of Law.  V& A: Voice and Accountability.  GDPg: GDP growth. Popg: Population growth.  Eng: English Common-Law. Frch: French Civil-Law. Chris: Christian Religion. LI: Low  
Income. MI: Middle Income. LMI: Lower Middle Income. UMI: Upper Middle Income. Free: Freedom of the Press. PFree: Partial Freedom of the Press. NFree: No Freedom of the Press. 
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Appendix 3: Variable Definitions
Variables Signs Variable Definitions Sources
Stock Market Capitalization SMC Stock Market Capitalization(% of GDP) World Bank(FDSD)
Stock Market Value Traded SMVT Stock Market Total Value Traded(% of GDP) World Bank(FDSD)
Stock Market Turnover SMT Stock Market Turnover Ratio World Bank(FDSD)
Listed Companies ListC Number of Listed Companies Per(% of Population) World Bank(FDSD)
Control of Corruption CC Control of Corruption(estimate) World Bank(WDI)
Government Effectiveness Gov. E Government Effectiveness(estimate) World Bank(WDI)
Political Stability/ No Violence PolS Political Stability/ No Violence (estimate) World Bank(WDI)
Regulation Quality R.Q Regulation Quality (estimate) World Bank(WDI)
Rule of Law R.L Rule of Law(estimate) World Bank(WDI)
Voice and Accountability V & A Voice and Accountability (estimate) World Bank(WDI)
Population growth Popg Average annual population growth rate World Bank(WDI)
Growth of GDP GDPg Average annual GDP growth rate World Bank(WDI)
Population growth Popg Average annual population growth rate World Bank(WDI)
FDSD: Financial Development and Structure Database. WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.
Appendix 4: Presentation of Countries
Instruments Instrument Category Countries Num
Law
English Common-Law Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria, South 
Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
10
French Civil-Law Ivory Coast,  Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia. 4
Religion 
Christianity 
Botswana,  Ivory Coast, Ghana, Kenya,  Mauritius, Namibia, 
South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
10
Islam Egypt,  Morocco, Nigeria, Tunisia. 4
Income 
Levels
Low Income Ghana, Kenya, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 4
Middle Income Botswana, Ivory Coast, Egypt, Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia, 
Nigeria, South Africa, Swaziland, Tunisia.
10
Lower Middle Income Ivory Coast, Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan, 
Swaziland, Tunisia.
8
Upper Middle Income  Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa. 4
Num: Number of cross sections(countries)
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